Security of Supply

11 January 2017:
Bottlenecks in the Nordic Grids during the Storm "Urd"
Readers of my note from 30 December 2016 have asked why Sweden has prevented a transit of electricity from Denmark to Norway. This additional note tries to locate some of the bottlenecks in the Nordic grids from 22 December to 31 December 2016. The "west coast corridor" in Sweden is a real problem to Svenska Kraftnät. We cannot exclude that curtailment of import under certain circumstances is the only way out. Additional wind and solar power in Europe will make such circumstaces more frequent.

1 January 2017:
South Australia: Wind Generation did not Survive Multiple Voltage Dips
AEMO's third report on the blackout 28 September 2016
An update report from the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) reveals new details on the circumstances of the blackout. A non-credible combination of circumstances caused the event, but AEMO also indicates that better weather forecasts and adequate information on the wind turbine protection systems could have activated more suitable preparations.

30 December 2016:
Grids Challenged by the Christmas Storm "Urd"
The Christmas days in 2016 were characterized by strong winds. The wind power variations were handled successfully by the Danish grid operator, Energinet.dk. It has apparently been necessary or profitable to curtail wind power in Denmark.
My note describes Nordic and German spot markets and power exchanges for the days 22 to 27 December.

13 October 2016:
Blackout in South Australia on 28 September 2016
The role of wind power and operating reserves not yet cleared up
Three 275 kV lines and 315 MW wind power were disconnected during a heavy storm in South Australia. Import from Victoria increased correspondingly and the interconnector to Victoria tripped for overload. The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) has published a preliminary report on the incident.
AEMO's preliminary report and my summary.
19 October 2016: AEMO's updated report and interpretation by ABC News

9 April 2016:
ENTSO-E Expects Declining, but Sufficient Capacity Reserves in 2025
Denmark will not maintain power stations as backup capacity. ENTSO-E's Scenario Outlook & Adequacy Forecast 2015 seems to support this position.
Read my comment on ENTSO-E's report.
Download ENTSO-E's report here

7 August 2014:
Urgent Need for a Capacity Market in Denmark
Denmark is closing efficient power plants down. Capacity arrangements in the neighbouring countries and a Danish deficit of dispatchable capacity will bring Denmark into a vulnerable position.

9 July 2014:
Are the Grids Sufficiently Prepared for Emergencies?
A letter to the editor of IEEE Power & Energy contains the disturbing observation that restoration times after blackouts are significantly increasing in th US since the nineteen sixties.
Here is the story.

13 June 2014:
Does Germany have the Best Security of Supply in the EU?
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWI) claims that Germany has the most reliable electricity supply in the EU. But the comparison with other EU-countries is biased and BMWI ignores Denmark. See my comment.

8 May 2013:
50 Years' Blackout Lessons
Blackout investigation reports have been important sources of improved operating security of power systems.
Read here about lessons learned and ignored.

9 April 2016:
ENTSO-E Expects Declining, but Sufficient Capacity Reserves in 2025
Denmark will not maintain power stations as backup capacity. ENTSO-E's Scenario Outlook & Adequacy Forecast 2015 seems to support this position.
Read my comment on ENTSO-E's report.
Download ENTSO-E's report here

9 January 2013:
A Game on Security of Supply
Will there be sufficient power plant capacity in Denmark in the future? The Danish Energy Association says no. The Danish system operator, Energinet.dk, is confident that new interconnectors can replace domestic power plants.
Read more here

17 December 2012:
A New Interpretation of Security of Supply
On the 28th November 2012 the German Government adopted an order on the disconnection of large electricity consumers within the framework of intelligent grids. The reason is the still more frequent cases of strained conditions on the German transmission grids caused by the "Energiewende".
See more here

9 September 2012:
The Worlds Biggest Blackout
On 30 July 2012 and again on the following day large grid disturbances occurred in India. AC grids are complex systems and especially large AC grids are vulnerable. In India local overloads started cascading outages affecting up to 620 million people.

11 June 2012:
The San Diego Blackout 8 September 2011 caused by carelessness
The Ferc/Nerc investigation report demonstrates that the system collapse was caused by insufficient planning tools, inadequate situational awareness and uncoordinated relay settings. The recommendations after the blackout in 2003 seem to have been negelected.

11th October 2011:
German Nuclear Stop Pressing Electricity Security
Germany has stopped the operation of 8 GW nuclear power. Further 14 GW nuclear power will be decommissioned until 2022. The maximum electricity demand is about 80 GW. How will the nuclear power be replaced?
See my comment.

9th September 2011:
Extensive Power Outage in USA
Thursday evening routine works on the substation Hassayampa in Arizona caused disconnection of a 500 kV line to California. After cascading outages several millions in Arizona, Mexico and California, particularly San Diego, lost power. The electricity supply was reestablished during Friday morning.
A survey of the event will be presented here when sufficient details are available.

28th August 2011:
Import of gas and security of supply in the UK
Howard Rogers from The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies challenges in an excellent report the rosy expectations on the future energy supply in the UK.
The increasing dependency on imported gas is not only a British problem, but a problem to Western Europe. It has a worrying similarity with the oil dependency prior to 1973.

Opdateret d. 31.1.2017